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Military spending, fatalities, and the destruction of capital, all of which are immediately felt and are
often large, are the most overt costs of war. They are also relatively short-lived. The costs of war borne
by combatants and their caretakers, which includes families, communities, and the modern welfare
state, tend instead to be lifelong. In this paper I show that a significant component of the public costs
associated with U.S. wars are long-lived.  One third to one half of the total present value of historical
war costs have been absorbed by benefits distributed over the remaining life spans of veterans and
their dependents. The half-life of these benefits has averaged more than 30 years following the end
of hostilities. Estimates of the value of injuries and deaths, while uncertain, suggest that the private
burden of war borne by survivors, namely the uncompensated costs of service-related injuries, are
also large and long-lived.
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Interest in the economics of armed conﬂict is on the rise. Blattman and Miguel (2010) review
recent research eﬀorts and issue a plea for improved data collection eﬀorts. Glick and Taylor
(2010) examine the trade costs of warfare, estimating them to be similar in magnitude to
the human costs. A focal point of interest has been the cost of the 21st century U.S. wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, examined extensively by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) and also by
Nordhaus (2002), Wallsten and Kosec (2005) and Davis, Murphy and Topel (2009). The
three trillion dollar price tag estimated by Stiglitz and Bilmes, a focal point of much popular
attention, includes present and future spending on military activities, support of veterans,
the uncompensated costs of death and disability, and macroeconomic and borrowing costs.
Edwards (2010) reviews these studies.
Nordhaus (2002) provides historical context by examining direct military spending in past
U.S. conﬂicts, and Edelstein (2000) reviews the history of 20th century war cost assessments
dating back to Clark (1931). A textbook treatment of the macroeconomics of warfare would
discuss defense spending and its eﬀect on aggregate demand, alongside the death toll and
capital destruction. But such an analysis omits several key types of costs that, as Nordhaus
discusses, are more diﬃcult to reckon. The most apparent omissions are the budgetary
costs of compensating and caring for surviving veterans, which Clark (1931) omitted. Far
less easy to measure are any uncompensated costs of injury and death borne by veterans
and their families. And there are also readjustment costs borne by children, spouses, and
communities, all of which are even more nebulous (Institute of Medicine, 2010). In addition,
the costs of military action should be weighed against those of inaction, as argued and
operationalized by Wallsten and Kosec (2005) and Davis, Murphy and Topel (2009). In the
case of veterans’ beneﬁts in the U.S., the counterfactual quickly becomes convoluted as a
result of the overlapping social safety nets provided by Medicare and VA health beneﬁts.
Goldin and Lewis (1975) assess the costs of the Civil War using a broad methodology
designed to capture the budgetary, human, and opportunity costs, namely the costs of fore-
2gone consumption or any beneﬁts of accelerated industrialization. But their analysis appears
to omit veterans’ beneﬁts, and it calculates the human costs solely as the present value of
future wages foregone either because of death or wounds.1 The recent analysis by Glick and
Taylor (2010) extends these techniques to losses on all sides in the two world wars. Research
into the economic valuation of life has revealed that the willingness to pay for mortality risk
reduction implies a value of a statistical life (VSL) in modern periods that is much larger
than the capitalized value of future wages alone (Viscusi, 1993; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).
The true human costs of historical warfare depend on the VSL and, by extension, its income
elasticity, a parameter of independent interest and uncertain magnitude over space and time
(Viscusi and Aldy, 2003; Costa and Kahn, 2004; Hall and Jones, 2007).
In this paper, I reassess the human costs of U.S. wars alongside a broader accounting of
their budgetary costs, which consist of veterans’ health and disability beneﬁts in addition to
direct military costs. By and large, these data exist already in the Historical Statistics of the
United States for periods prior to 1970. To produce a full accounting of costs for conﬂicts
with surviving veterans and dependents past 1970, I extrapolate using standard techniques.
I augment these data with estimates of VA disability ratings, which provide some sense of
health conditions among surviving veterans, drawn from an array of recent cross sectional
surveys.
The most ironclad and interesting result is that the budgetary costs of providing death
and disability compensation, health care, and survivors’ beneﬁts to veterans and their de-
pendents are large and long-lasting. I ﬁnd that those costs represent between one third and
one half of the total present value of all war costs, and their half life has averaged more than
thirty years and may be rising with recent conﬂicts. That a component of direct war costs
should be so large and persistent is a novel ﬁnding that modiﬁes the textbook conceptualiza-
tion of modern wars as costly but relatively short. The timing result also mirrors the insight
recently oﬀered by the Institute of Medicine (2010) and Edwards (2010) regarding the life
1Goldin and Lewis assume that all Civil War wounded lose half their future earning potential, while the
dead lose it all.
3cycle of veterans’ disability beneﬁts, which tend to peak some thirty years after hostilities
cease. Rapidly rising costs of medical care have no doubt recently contributed to this general
pattern, but it also predates the modern VA system and the period of signiﬁcant health care
price inﬂation. Rather, the life cycle of veterans’ beneﬁts appears to reﬂect an initial latency
and persistence of service-related disability among surviving veterans.
Much uncertainty surrounds the economic value of historical losses of life and health,
but estimates I recover are never small. The human costs of recent warfare in particular
are unambiguously large. The private costs of disability are as long-lived as the public
costs of compensation and health care. For recent cohorts of veterans, the uncompensated
private costs, which is the diﬀerence between the two, also called the social economic costs
by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), appear to be large. During far-removed historical periods,
the result depends on assumptions regarding injury prevalence and on the income elasticity
of the VSL. When the latter is high, the estimated costs of lost lives and health during
historical periods are lower because incomes were much lower then than they are now. A
given dollar amount of veterans’ beneﬁts compensates relatively more for a given level of
harm when the income elasticity of the VSL is high.
In the sections that follow, I ﬁrst describe my data sources in greater detail and provide a
summary overview of personnel involved in major U.S. wars and causalities. Then I calculate
the life cycles of veterans and of war-related budgetary costs for each past U.S. conﬂict,
and I compare and contrast each across conﬂicts. Next I present and discuss estimates
of VA disability ratings among survivors of recent wartime and peacetime cohorts. The
VA disability ratings facilitate a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the net health impact on
surviving veteran cohorts, which I cost out according to assumptions about the income
elasticity of the VSL. In the ﬁnal section I discuss a limited counterfactual scenario, in which
I omit any discussion of the costs of avoiding war and focus on the budgetary and private
impacts of warfare relative to a baseline of maintaining peacetime forces only. Such a scenario
raises the obvious question of why countries would have a standing military at all, if it were
4never used, but I believe the scenario still provides new and useful, if limited, insights as a
counterfactual.2
2 Data and assumptions
2.1 Historical Statistics of the U.S.
My primary data source for information on wars and veterans are the Historical Statistics
of the United, Tables Ed1–399 States (Carter et al., 2006). Of these, the preponderance of
statistics are derived from Tables Ed1–5, which list casualties for major U.S. wars; Tables
Ed168–170, which show the estimated direct military costs of U.S. wars; and Tables Ed324–
336, which present the expenditures of the Veterans Administration and its predecessor
agencies by veterans’ period of service.3 I augment the casualty lists for recent wars using
data from the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) of the Defense Manpower
Data Center, which are current through March 6, 2010.4 Military spending for the First
Gulf War and for Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) are taken from are
taken Nordhaus (2002) and Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) respectively, the latter the “realistic-
moderate” forecast as of 2008.
Costs of veteran cohorts prior to 1866, which are primarily those associated with the
Revolutionary War cohort, are given in a single lump sum, which I distribute across years
according to other sources.5 Costs by conﬂict end in 1970, so I extrapolate costs for World
2Military forces can still have value solely as a deterrent, as evidenced by the presence of large nuclear
arsenals among major world powers. But it is clear that wars can also bring beneﬁts to victors that may
include territory, freedom or its inverse, and possibly economic growth. Several studies seem to suggest that
war is never a net beneﬁt, however (Goldin and Lewis, 1975; Nordhaus, 2002).
3Following the Civil War, a number of former Confederate states independently established pensions for
veterans of the Confederacy. But to my knowledge, whatever statistics may exist have not been assembled,
let alone examined.
4http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm
5For the Revolutionary War cohort, I distribute nominal dollars across years according to amounts re-
ported for several non-consecutive years by Glasson (1918), and then after 1840 according to the diminution
pattern of spending on veterans of the War of 1812, shifted 32 years earlier in time. The total sum of nominal
dollars I set a small amount of undistributed spending on veterans of the War 1812 as occurring in 1871, the
last year before which annual spending is reported.
5War I and later wars to 1997 using Tables Ed311–323, which lists VA costs by function
through 1998; and Ed351–371, which presents compensation and pension (VBA) costs by
period of service through 1997.6 For veterans of the Spanish-American War and earlier
conﬂicts, who are eﬀectively extinct by 1970, I model nominal costs as declining 15 percent
annually, which is roughly the average rate of decline observed for extinct cohorts in the
data. I also institute this rule for the World War I cohort after 1997.
For the World War II, Korean, Vietnam, and First Gulf War cohorts after 1997, I model
costs per surviving veteran plus costs per survivor. A more precise method of forecasting
would model additional parameters, such as the proportion of veterans who utilize health
care and compensation programs and the intensity of utilization, where the latter is based
on health status. But data limitations hamper that level of analysis, and evidence both
from aggregate time series and cross sections suggest that focusing on usage per surviving
veteran is a reasonable alternative, at least for cohorts past a certain age. I explore the
cross-sectional trends that support this perspective in section 5.1 below.
Veteran populations are given for historical periods in Tables Ed245–261, and for future
periods by the VetPop 2007 projections obtained from the VA website.7 I measure total
nominal costs net of survivor beneﬁts per surviving veteran in 1997 as $1,531 for the World
War II cohort, $890 for the Korean cohort, and $1,489 for the Vietnam cohort, and I assume
a per capita cost of $1,500 for First Gulf War veterans. This assumption seems reasonable
in light of similarities in disability rates between Vietnam and First Gulf War veterans that
emerge in the cross-sectional surveys I examine in section 5.1.8 Growth in real per capita
6Based on patterns observed during the overlapping of these series between 1960 and 1970, I assign half
of “All Other Expenditures” (Ed323) to veterans and recover an annual scaling factor that recovers total VA
spending (medical plus compensation and pensions plus vocational plus half of other) from compensation
and pensions alone. I apply these methods to VA costs for the World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam,
and First Gulf War cohorts.
7The latter categorizes as “Gulf War” all veterans serving after 1990. I extrapolated the number of
veterans of the First Gulf War from these ﬁgures by assuming there are 2,223,000 surviving veterans up
to the peak of the VetPop series, in 2025, after which survivorship follows the same course, falling in half
by 2054. By comparison, the Vietnam cohort is expected to halve around 2027. This technique will likely
overstate the number of surviving First Gulf War veterans because in the VetPop data they are mixed in
with younger cohorts.
8This method will tend to overstate First Gulf War costs to the extent that the number of veterans on
6costs after 1997 is 0 percent for the World War II cohort, 1.5 percent for the Korean cohort,
and 3.5 percent for the Vietnam cohort, all extrapolated from trends in the data after 1980.
For First Gulf War costs, which the Historical Statistics do not measure well, I assume the
same rate of annual increase as found for the Vietnam cohort, and I backcast costs to 1991
by combining that assumption with past headcounts and the $1,500 per capita cost in 1997.
I assume a future rate of CPI price inﬂation of 3 percent. Numbers of survivors by period
of service are given by Tables Ed388 and Ed295 up to 1995 for the World War II, Korea,
Vietnam, and Gulf cohorts. I decrement each series according to a female cohort life table
published by Social Security (Bell and Miller, 2005).9 Levels of beneﬁts are given by Tables
Ed362 and Ed367, and I forecast 6 percent nominal growth beginning from their 1995 levels,
roughly the average annual rate of historical increase.
Estimates of real GDP and population from 1790 are available in Tables Ca9–19. For
years prior to 1790, I assume constant growth in GDP and population based on the period
1790 to 1810. After 2002, I supplement this series with recent BEA data, and I inﬂate
the series to 2008 chained dollars. Data on CPI inﬂation with base period 1982–1984 are
available in Table Cc1, which I append using recent BLS data. To obtain nominal discount
rates, I use a composite of series in Tables Cj1192–1194, which are averages of yields on
longer-term issues of either the U.S. government or municipalities. I splice gaps in the ﬁrst
series assuming ﬁxed risk premia between the three. Between 1997 and 2009, I use the market
yield on 10-year Treasury securities reported in the Fed’s H15 release, spliced with the same
assumption. For forecast periods after 2009, I specify a 4.5 percent nominal discount rate and
a 3 percent rate of CPI inﬂation, mirroring the assumptions of Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008).
disability rolls (Institute of Medicine, 2010) and disability ratings both tend to rise as the cohort ages, as
shown in section 5.1. I do not capture this dynamic at all in my forecast because of data limitations. But the
method will understate costs to the extent that in any period, younger cohorts of veterans are considerably
more costly on a per capita basis in the data. Setting First Gulf War costs per capita only slightly above
Vietnam costs likely understates the former.
9For the World War II cohort, I use the life table for the female cohort born in 1900; for the Korean
cohort, I use the 1920 life table; for the Vietnam cohort, 1950; for the First Gulf War cohort, 1970. To the
extent that dependents also obtain death pension and compensation beneﬁts, this method will understate
true future costs.
7Data on federal government debt are provided in Tables Ea587 and Ea728.
In order to assess the total costs of relatively recent wars, one must project veterans’
beneﬁts over a fairly long horizon. According to my forecast, nominal ﬂows of costs associated
with the First Gulf War are unlikely to cease before 2090. For OEF/OIF, I use the forecasts
of spending on veterans provided by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008).
2.2 Cross-sectional surveys of veterans
In addition to dollars of beneﬁts, another key variable is the health status of surviving
veterans. Past studies of historical conﬂicts have made do with rules of thumb based on
oﬃcial casualty statistics: the “Wounds Not Mortal” category (Goldin and Lewis, 1975;
Glick and Taylor, 2010). These studies assume each nonfatal casualty represents a case of
50 percent disability.
My strategy improves on that method by examining VA disability ratings, which are
traditionally designed to reﬂect work disability and can be interpreted as revealing the per-
centage reduction in quality of life (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). With suﬃcient data, I could
also calculate quality adjusted life years or some other measure, but the added diﬃculty
would be specifying the change in QALYs or health status that is attributable to military
service. The VA disability rating is designed to do exactly that.
In principle, all veterans examined by the VA during modern periods should have medical
records that indicate their health status in some fashion. We also know from the CPE Union
Army Dataset that medical records exist for Civil War era pensions. But a challenge is
obtaining statistics that are representative of the average veteran’s condition. The Union
Army data are neither universal nor weighted, for example.
As of this writing, I am unaware of any oﬃcial statistics on disability ratings or health
conditions for entire veteran cohorts. One of the issues is that under U.S. law, veterans
have had to voluntary approach the VA and predecessor agencies in order to obtain VA
disability ratings. Time trends in disability headcounts and payments suggest that veterans
8do not obtain disability ratings all at once, and even if they did, the average service-related
disability rating for the cohort is in considerable ﬂux during the ﬁrst decades after the conﬂict
(Institute of Medicine, 2010). While military service records would probably have recorded
physical and possibly mental injuries, it seems unlikely that these records have ever been
systematically assessed for entire cohorts of veterans.
What I currently have are several cross-sectional surveys of veterans in which respondents
are asked their VA disability ratings and their period of service. These datasets include the
1983 Survey of Aging Veterans (SAV), the 1992 National Survey of Veterans (NSV), the 2001
National Survey of Veterans, and the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS). The ﬁrst
three surveys were commissioned by the VA, they exclusively cover veterans, and they range
in size from about 3,000 in the SAV to 11,600 and 20,000 in the two NSVs. The 2008 ACS
surveyed some 250,000 veterans out of a total population of around 23.4 million. Earlier
waves of the ACS did not ask about VA disability ratings, and neither did the decennial
Census. Coverage of VA disability status in various Current Population Surveys exists but
is spotty and does not begin before 1985.
3 The scope and aftermath of conﬂicts
Wars are costly because personnel and mat´ eriel must be deployed to combat zones, because
hostilities result in deaths and wounded, and because surviving veterans and survivors of
deceased veterans require medical care and are entitled to compensation. All of these costs
tend to vary with the scope of the conﬂict, with oﬀensive and defensive military technology,
with medical technology, and with the general mortality environment faced by veterans and
their survivors.
Table 1 lists statistics detailing several of these dimensions for each major U.S. war. The
left panel shows estimates of military personnel involved, military fatalities, the number
of service members experiencing wounds that did not result in death, and the number of
9surviving veterans, calculated as total personnel minus deaths.10 The right panel displays
several crude incidence indicators: the number of wounded per participating personnel,
wounded per killed, and wounded per surviving veteran.
Conﬂicts have varied widely in terms of overall scope, with World War II the largest
conﬂict to date in terms of participants.11 The most deaths occurred during the Civil War,
if fatalities on both sides are counted; otherwise World War II was also the deadliest. Recent
conﬂicts, especially the two following the Vietnam War, have been more limited in scope.
Soldiers serving during the Civil War, especially on the Confederate side, were the most
likely in history to have died or been wounded. The indicators in Table 1 reveal that nearly
20 percent of surviving veterans had physical war wounds. Because mental health trauma
appears to have been a signature combat ailment in each historical era (Institute of Medicine,
2010), the share of surviving veterans with either physical or mental wounds was probably
higher still. In other conﬂicts, the proportion of survivors with war wounds has ﬂuctuated
between 2 and 6 percent, averaging 2.5 percent.
In recent conﬂicts, most notably OEF/OIF, the share of wounded soldiers per fatality
has risen. This statistic measures roughly how likely it is that a service member will survive
his or her wounds. While relatively high during the Revolution and the War of 1812 at about
1.5 wounded per death, this measure fell to about 0.75 during the early mechanization of war
in the later 19th century. It rose to 1.7 during the World Wars and 2.7 during the Korean
and Vietnam conﬂicts before dropping to 1.2 during the brief and largely airborne First Gulf
War. In OEF/OIF to date, the statistic is nearly 7 wounded per death. Improvements in
emergency medical care and more rapid evacuation by air to trauma centers are responsible
for the improvements in survival probability (Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008).
10The “wounds not mortal” category probably does not include mental health trauma per se. The former
appears to be a statistic that is reported by the service branches during hostilities in order to describe
changes in net force strength. Mental health injuries unaccompanied by physical injuries seem likely to have
been coded diﬀerently, but it is far from clear. The typical interpretation of these statistics, as in Tanielian
and Jaycox (2008) for example, is that they capture the prevalence of nonfatal physical wounds.
11As shown in Table 3, the number of participants per resident population was also highest during World
War II, at 11.7 percent. Next highest was the Civil War at 9.6 percent, and the Revolution at 7.7 percent.
The last three wars have involved 4.4, 0.9, and 0.7 percent of the U.S. population.
10Despite the growth in the probability of surviving wounds, the number of wounded as a
share of surviving veterans has fallen recently, from about 4.4 percent during the World Wars
to 1.8 percent in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq and Afghanistan. This may reﬂect an increasing
mechanization or automation of warfare, or a force reconﬁguration toward more support
units and fewer combat units, or both. Other things equal, a more limited share of the
wounded among surviving veterans should reduce per-capita need and compensation. But a
greater intensity of nonfatal harm among wounded survivors, as implied by their increased
survival probability, would clearly work against that.
The severity of wounds is no doubt a major determinant of the future survival of veteran
cohorts,12 but the latter is foremost the product of the prevailing mortality environment,
which has improved markedly over time. Figure 1 plots survivorship curves for veterans
cohorts starting with the War of 1812, where the horizontal axis shows years from the
end of the conﬂict. As mortality rates have fallen in the U.S. in general, survivorship for
each successive cohort of veterans has improved. While it took only about 20 years for
survivorship to dwindle to half of all veterans from the War of 1812 and the Mexican War,
the half life of the Civil War cohort was 40, more than 45 years for veterans of World War
I, and higher still for later cohorts. Today the median veteran is expected to live for more
than 60 years following the end of hostilities. These survivorship projections roughly match
cohort mortality forecasts provided by the Social Security Administration (Bell and Miller,
2005).
12Veterans’ beneﬁts may also be a determinant of post-service survival. But research in health economics
suggests that at least for the average individual at older ages today, causality may run more from health
into wealth rather than the reverse (Adams et al., 2003).
114 The budgetary costs of war and veterans
4.1 Annual costs in 2008 dollars
Figures 2, 3, and 4 plot real veterans’ costs in 2008 dollars for ten major U.S. wars for each
calendar year. Figure 2 shows real costs for the American Revolution, the War of 1812,
and the Mexican War, none of which ever exceeded $80 million in 2008 prices in a year. As
discussed by Glasson (1918), pensions for Revolutionary War veterans at ﬁrst were relatively
small, limited primarily to oﬃcers but also including some with service-related disabilities.
The service-pension act of 1818, originally suggested by the Monroe Administration as a
response to perceived need, expanded beneﬁts massively and unexpectedly.13 Spending on
Revolutionary War veterans and their survivors ﬂuctuated but remained high until dimin-
ishing rapidly after 1850, some 67 years after the end of the conﬂict. The wars with Britain
and Mexico similarly resulted in large outlays with long right tails, but it was not until the
General Law pension system of 1862 and subsequent legislation was passed that spending
expanded greatly (Glasson, 1918; Linares, 2001).
The Civil War was a watershed event in the development of the modern military com-
pensation system in the U.S., a fact to which Figure 3 attests. The Disability Act of 1890
actually extended beneﬁts to veterans based on length of service, rather than only on speciﬁc
service-related disabilities (Costa, 1998; Linares, 2001). Under that law, annual spending
on Civil War veterans’ compensation swelled to almost $4 billion in today’s dollars, and all
compensation represented almost 30 percent of the federal budget at the time (Costa, 1998,
p. 197). Again, these beneﬁts were extremely long-lived, dropping under $1 billion only
after 1935, fully 70 years after the conﬂict.
Beneﬁts for Spanish-American War veterans were limited until expansions in the 1920s
13Glasson (1918) discusses this on pages 65–74. Federal budget surpluses following the War of 1812
prompted their actions, but Monroe and others vastly underestimated the number of surviving Revolutionary
War veterans. The rapid growth in spending visible in Figure 2 triggered a string of legislative ﬁxes that
ﬁrst restricted and then again expanded beneﬁts.
12and 1930s following the creation of the Veterans’ Bureau in 1921.14 The downward spike
in beneﬁts and its reversal in the mid 1930s was the result of wrangling between Congress
and FDR,15 presumably over the massive budget deﬁcits of the Great Depression. Spending
diminished gradually from a peak of $2 billion in 1939 to less than a quarter billion by 1970.
Figure 4 shows real spending on veterans of World War I and later conﬂicts. The picture
is dominated by the massive spike in beneﬁts on the World War II cohort immediately after
hostilities ceased, reaching $60 billion in today’s prices in 1947. These short-lived ﬂows,
which totaled roughly $6.7 billion in current dollars, reﬂect the unprecedented educational
transfers of the midcentury G.I. Bill (Bound, 2002; Stanley, 2003). These alone accounted
for $3.6 billion or about 54 percent of all spending on the World War II cohort in 1947 (OMB,
2009, Table 11.3). Beneﬁts dropped rapidly afterward, reaching a nadir of $16.5 billion in
1956 before climbing to another peak of $37.3 billion in 1975, thirty years after the end of
hostilities. The Korean War cohort also saw a massive spike in their beneﬁts around 1956,
probably the last year of coverage under the G.I. Bill, which lapsed in 1955 (Institute of
Medicine, 2010). Like World War II veterans, their real transfers peaked again around 1975,
23 years after hostilities.
The World War I cohort’s peak year of real beneﬁts was probably 1962, some 44 years
after the end of the war. The graph depicts another peak in 1971, another 9 years later, but
data after 1970 are estimates based only on compensation and pensions by cohort. Still, the
uptick measured in 1970 was real.
For the Vietnam cohort, beneﬁts were monotonically increasing almost universally through-
out the historical period. I forecast they will peak at just under $30 billion per year around
2020, 45 years after the end of the war. This is because according to the VA’s VetPop
forecasts, the annual force of mortality only then reaches 3.5 percent, the average annual
rate of growth in real costs per capita found in data for that cohort since 1980. First Gulf
War costs, which are considerably more uncertain for reasons I discussed in section 2.1, are
14VA History in Brief, http://www1.va.gov/opa/publications/archives/docs/history in brief.pdf
15Ibid.
13expected to peak around 2045 for the same reason.
4.2 Veterans’ costs in present value
The very long-lived nature of veterans’ budgetary costs implies that the right way to com-
pare them to short-lived costs of war like military spending is by calculating their present
discounted value. For each major war, I deﬂate spending on veterans in each year past the
start of the conﬂict by a discount factor that reﬂects the cumulative force of compounded
interest measured from the middle year of the conﬂict. I take as my nominal discount rate
the average interest rate on long-term government bonds described in section 2.1 above. This
produces a series of present discounted values of future spending on veterans for each con-
ﬂict in current dollars, which are comparable to the current dollar totals of military spending
during the conﬂict. When comparing diﬀerent conﬂicts, I can inﬂate both of these using the
CPI to recover real values in 2008 dollars.
4.2.1 The life cycle of veterans’ costs
First, it is useful to examine the time path or life cycle of veterans’ spending by constructing
the cumulative present value of veterans’ spending remaining to be spent as of each year
past the end of each conﬂict. This number can be expressed as a proportion of the total
present value of veterans’ spending for that conﬂict. The result is a statistic similar to the
survivorship probability measure in a life table. Like survivorship, this statistic reveals how
long-lived the costs are, in a present value sense, of treating and compensating veterans of
wars.
Figure 5 plots this survivorship series for costs against years since the end of the conﬂict
for each of the 10 major U.S. wars for which I have data and forecasts. There is similarity in
that all curves slope upward toward the asymptote at unity, but there is also a considerable
amount of heterogeneity in the slopes themselves. The schedules for World War II and
the Korean War, at the far left of the ﬁgure, are very steeply sloped at ﬁrst, reﬂecting the
14large G.I. Bill disbursements early in the life spans of those cohorts. In both cases, their
half lives, where 50 percent of spending has been disbursed, occur relatively quickly, after
about 20 years have elapsed. At the other end, spending on veterans from the War of 1812,
the Mexican War, and the Spanish American War was all considerably delayed due to the
vagaries in development of military pension laws. For these cohorts, half lives were more like
50 or more years. In between these extremes lie the other 5 conﬂicts, with no clear pattern
governing their relative positions. Vietnam and the First Gulf War reach their half lives
at 32 and 41 years respectively; World War I reached its at 38 years. Although veterans’
survivorship schedules are advancing rightward, as remaining life expectancies increase with
mortality declines, the life cycles of costs have not necessarily followed this pattern at all.16
For all 10 conﬂicts, the average half life of costs is 37.5 years from the end of hostilities;
among the 6 cohorts prior to World War II subject to minimal cost forecasting, the average
was 44.2 years.
Compared to the patterns in veterans’ survivorship seen in Figure 1, trends in the
longevity of veterans’ costs follow no clear pattern. This seems odd at ﬁrst given how
the two should be closely related. The diﬀerences between them must reﬂect changes in
veteran compensation regimes, which apparently are large enough to overwhelm the eﬀects
of monotonically increasing survivorship.17 In light of this, the shorter life span of beneﬁts
following World War II and Korea, while real, is also somewhat misleading. Half lives are
shorter because these beneﬁts were front-loaded with massive educational outlays under the
G.I. Bill. It would be a mistake to construe such a trend, which may be repeated now under
the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill expansion, as indicating a reduction in the net ﬁscal burden of caring
for veterans. Rather, it would represent a net increase in the ﬁscal burden that also moves
its center of gravity forward in time.
16By no accident, the two cohorts whose costs follow this pattern are Vietnam and the First Gulf War, no
doubt because costs for the latter are entirely estimated based on veterans’ survivorship.
17If post-service mortality rises with the degree of war wounds, then the trend toward increased survival
among the wounded over time could have reduced the half-life of veterans’ costs by producing more acutely
wounded veterans who die earlier. But the proportion of surviving veterans who were wounded at all has
also fallen.
154.2.2 Veterans’ costs as a share of total costs
Second, it is revealing to compare the present discounted value of veterans costs associated
with military conﬂict to the direct military costs. Because I am using the same deﬂator to
translate current dollars into real dollars, the results will be independent of whether I inﬂate
historical statistics or not.18 I present results in billions of 2008 dollars, in order to provide
easy comparability to the estimates of Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008).
Table 2 presents historical war costs for the 10 conﬂicts shown in Figure 5 plus estimates
for the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan produced by Stiglitz and Bilmes. The left side
of the table is similar to data presented by Nordhaus (2002), from whom I take the datum
on the direct military costs of the First Gulf War. The diﬀerences result from my using a
later version of the Historical Statistics, in which some updated estimates are provided by
Goldin (1980).
The center panel in Table 2 reveals the total and present value of veterans’ costs in a
variety of formats. In current dollars, veterans’ costs literally explode over time, to no great
surprise. In real terms, the sum total rises and dips along with the direct costs of military
activities, proxying the scope of conﬂicts. The most useful comparison is the present value
of veterans’ beneﬁts measured from the midpoint of the war in 2008 dollars, in the third
column of the center panel. This number is extremely small for early conﬂicts, for which
appreciable veterans’ beneﬁts were a long way oﬀ, and considerably larger for more recent
conﬂicts. It reaches $1.4 trillion for World War II, $555 billion for Vietnam, and $372 billion
for the First Gulf War. Out of the $3 trillion in costs estimated by Stiglitz and Bilmes
(2008), $673 billion represents budgetary veterans’ costs.
The rightmost panel in Table 2 shows the total budgetary costs of these eleven major
18One could argue that nominal public budgetary costs ought to be deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator,
because at least in the modern era taxes are raised oﬀ of nominal GDP. This logic suggests that from the
perspective of measuring the present value of the net tax burden, real direct military costs and real veterans’
beneﬁts should be recovered using the GDP deﬂator. Notwithstanding the large diﬀerences in the nature of
the federal tax base over time, another problem is that the real value to veterans of veterans’ beneﬁts ought
to be based oﬀ the CPI instead. Without unambiguous theoretical motivations to use diﬀerent deﬂators, I
choose to apply the CPI to all ﬂows of cash.
16U.S. wars, and the share of those total present-value costs attributable to veterans’ beneﬁts.
The total cost of World War II is almost $6 trillion dollars in today’s prices, while the share
attributable to veterans’ costs is 23.5 percent. The First Gulf War stands out as a very
inexpensive military operation that is also associated with a very large amount of veterans’
beneﬁts, which account for 80 percent of total costs. This was not unprecedented; the
Spanish-American War was also relatively cheap when fought but very expensive in terms
of veterans’ costs, which account for 78.5 percent of all costs. Across all eleven conﬂicts, the
average share attributable to veterans’ costs is 35 percent; for conﬂicts since World War I,
the average is 41 percent.
4.2.3 Relative costs of war and veterans and implicit debt
Finally, it is useful to examine the magnitudes of war costs and participation relative to
population, involved personnel, and to GDP. Table 3 reports the share of the resident popu-
lation involved in each war, the direct military costs and the present value of veterans’ costs
per involved military personnel, and the ratios to GDP of costs and initial federal debt held
by the public.
Participation has varied enormously over these eleven conﬂicts, ranging from a low of 0.4
percent involved during the Mexican War, to 11.7 percent during World War II. Real costs
per soldier have also varied widely and loosely track participation, as one would expect if
both measures index the scope of war. But the real costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
per service member are vastly higher than in historical conﬂicts. Direct military spending per
soldier in Iraq or Afghanistan is near the one million dollar mark at three times the quarter
million dollars spent per World War II service member. The present value of veterans’ costs
per OEF/OIF soldier is more than $300,000.
Costs as a share of pre-conﬂict GDP track the participation rate more closely and provide
a better index of scope than do costs per participant. Another natural comparison is between
the ratio of war costs per GDP and the ratio of debt held by the public to GDP, which is
17measured at the beginning and the end of each conﬂict in the last two columns in Table
3. Other things equal, war costs raise indebtedness, but not necessarily one-for-one.19 For
example, the unprecedented level of direct military spending during World War II, equal to
almost three times initial GDP but spread over a period of ﬁve years, raised debt held by
the public from 36 to 94 percent of GDP.
By contrast, the present value of future veterans’ costs as a share of GDP is directly
comparable to the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of each conﬂict. The former is a measure of
implicit debt, the latter explicit debt, both scaled to income. An analogous measure is the
unfunded future liabilities of Social Security or Medicare, which respectively are on the order
of $5.3 and $13.4 trillion today,20 or roughly 40 and 90 percent of GDP. The implicit debt
associated with veterans’ costs has tended to be much smaller, on the order of 4 percent
of GDP, except in the cases of the World Wars and the Civil War, after which implicit
debts were between 20 and 50 percent of GDP. This analogy is also appropriate for another
reason. Like Social Security and Medicare spending, compensation and medical care for
veterans represent transfers of resources rather than additions to income. In this regard, the
share of total war costs attributable to veterans is likely to understate their net ﬁscal burden
relative to that of direct war costs, because the latter add to GDP.21
19Military spending is a direct addition to GDP, and although there may be some degree of crowding
out, the former raises the latter. But not only would GDP, the denominator, rise and reduce the debt to
GDP ratio, but part of military spending will also be self-ﬁnancing because income is taxed. If the defense
spending multiplier is unity and the federal tax take out of GDP is 0.18, for example, then only 82 percent
of direct military costs represents unfunded net borrowing.
20Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (2009);
Boards of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds
(2009).
21Pensions, or compensation unrelated to service-connected disability, are taxable, while VA disability
compensation is not. This would imply a net negative eﬀect of veterans’ transfer payments on the overall
tax take. If veterans spend their transfers at a faster rate than other taxpayers, however, there could in
theory be a positive eﬀect on taxes via a stimulative “multiplier” eﬀect on national income.
185 War-related costs of injury and death
The budgetary costs of war, which include the costs of compensation and treatment for war-
related trauma, are what governments and by extension taxpayers pay. But these transfers
may or may not fully compensate veterans and their survivors for war wounds. The system
of VA disability compensation, in which service-related disability is scored as a percentage of
total disability, is based on the ability to work and calibrated to the present value of future
labor market earnings (Institute of Medicine, 2007; Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). But the now
traditional view in health economics is that the full cost of disability to an individual is
reﬂected in his or her willingness to pay for reductions in risks to life and health. In modern
periods, the willingness to pay to avoid death or a particular illness is much larger than is
implied by the capitalized value of future wages foregone (Viscusi, 1993; Viscusi and Aldy,
2003). The human costs of warfare therefore hinge on the values of a statistical life and a
statistical injury, and not necessarily on VA and military compensation.
Given enough information, it would be possible to characterize and cost out each service-
related injury or death for every conﬂict. In practice, such a strategy faces two impediments.
First, there is a lack of consistency in any detailed measures of health status and conditions
across cohorts of veterans. For more than one conﬂict, one would have to cobble together
such data from an array of disparate sources. The second problem is that it is diﬃcult
to measure service-related health conditions as opposed to all health conditions. Standard
health surveys do not ask whether conditions are related to military service; such data
presumably is only available through the VA.
Data on speciﬁc conditions related to service are no doubt available in some form for
many cohorts of veterans from the VA. But a far more expeditious strategy is instead to use
survey-level measures of the VA disability rating alone. The measure is designed to quantify
service-related poor health as a percentage of total disability, so in principle it measures
something akin to a quality-adjusted life. If one is willing to assume that a life spent with
x percent VA disability is worth x percent of a disability-free life, then the total gross cost
19of service-related disability borne by that veteran is x times the value of a statistical life.
Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) use precisely this methodology, applying the VA disability rating
to the VSL in order to recover the social economic costs, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the gross costs and all disability compensation, of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In this section, I construct estimates of the costs of injury and death associated with
major U.S. wars using this methodology. The two key components are the prevalence of
disability and death among veterans, and the value of a statistical life.
5.1 Cohort-speciﬁc trends in VA disability ratings
The primary component of the historical costs of disability and death are the relative magni-
tudes of each among veterans. Deaths are easy to measure while disability is more diﬃcult.
Past studies have assumed that all service members who were reported as having “wounds
not mortal” in the oﬃcial military statistics were 50 percent disabled, while no other veter-
ans suﬀered any disability (Goldin and Lewis, 1975; Glick and Taylor, 2010). For conﬂicts
in the distant past, this assumption is diﬃcult to assess. For recent wars, I can measure
self-reported VA disability ratings for veteran cohorts and directly compare those statistics
to numbers wounded in action.
Table 4 presents weighted sample statistics from four cross-sectional snapshots taken
since 1980: the 1983 Survey of Aging Veterans (SAV), the 1992 and 2001 National Surveys
of Veterans (NSV), and the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS). The only dataset
that measures the World War I cohort, which on average was born before the 20th century,
is the 1983 SAV. Veteras from later conﬂicts are sequentially picked up in later surveys,
ending with the recently released 2008 ACS, which measured 14,588 veterans of the Iraq
and Afghanistan era. For each conﬂict, the ﬁrst three rows report the VA disability rating
averaged over all surviving veterans, the average VA disability rating among veterans with
a positive rating, and the share of the cohort with a positive rating. The next four rows list
weighted headcounts, the average age of the cohort, and the sample size.
20There is a limited degree of uniformity across veteran cohorts in their average VA disabil-
ity level in these data, which has hovered between 2 and 6 percent disabled. Veterans with
a positive rating typically experience about 35 percent disability, while they have accounted
for 10–15 percent of their cohort, sometimes less as in the case of the Korean War. But
behind this rough average that is immediately evident there is considerable variation over
ages and cohorts.22
Across all cohorts, there is a clear upward trajectory in the average VA disability rating
over the life cycle, which appears to decelerate after age 60 but continues to increase. The
exceptions to this pattern arise only when comparing the much smaller 1983 SAV to the later
surveys, and they are probably spurious. As revealed by the head counts of disabled veterans,
which appear below the prevalence indicators, the aggregate level of need ultimately declines
as the cohort dies oﬀ over time. Aggregate need drives the real dollars spent on veterans
shown in Figures 2–4, which explains the hump-shaped trajectory. But per capita need as
indexed here appears to increase continuously throughout age for these cohorts, driven by
increases along both extensive and intensive margins. This is the opposite of what one would
expect to happen naturally through attrition if mortality rates were increasing in the level of
VA disability. That both the prevalence and severity of disability appear to increase within
a cohort over time suggests that latent conditions are revealing themselves during the course
of aging.
There also is interesting variation across conﬂicts or cohorts, especially along the extensive
margin, or the share of veterans with a positive VA disability rating. Successively younger
cohorts of veterans seem to have higher VA disability ratings on average than older cohorts
did, both overall and at comparable ages. This appears to be driven more by a greater
prevalence of positive ratings within the cohort rather than a higher level or intensity of VA
22I recognize that age, time, and cohort eﬀects cannot be independently identiﬁed in observational data.
But I argue that there are clear theoretical reasons to support the existence of age and cohort eﬀects. Health
conditions can often be latent over the life cycle, suggesting that age eﬀects are likely to matter; and cohorts
of veterans clearly diﬀer in their exposure to risks because they served in diﬀerent theaters and used diﬀerent
defensive and oﬀensive military technology.
21disability among those with positive ratings. The patterns in VA disability in Table 4 do not
match the trends in percent wounded across conﬂicts that were presented in Table 1. In the
two World Wars, the latter was 4.2 percent; in Korea and later, it dropped to 1.8 percent. By
comparison, the average VA disability rating has risen, reaching 6.3 percent among Vietnam
and First Gulf War veterans, the latter at a far younger age. If VA disability is the gold
standard of measurement, it would appear that the incidence of war wounds in the defense
department statistics is a poor measure of the average health impact of warfare.
A very similar picture emerges when I examine VA disability among veterans who have
served only during peacetime. These statistics are reported in Table 5 for cohorts who served
only during three recent interwar periods. Average VA disability ratings for these peacetime
cohorts are not zero, although they average only one or two percent rather than up to six.
This is because the share with any disability is considerably lower than among war veterans,
and never above 8.2 percent in the table. Both the share disabled, and to a lesser extent the
intensity of disability among the disabled, rise within these peacetime cohorts as they age,
just as within wartime cohorts. The minimum average disability rating across all peacetime
cohorts is 0.5 percent.
The evolution of VA disability over the life course, the strong age eﬀects that I argue are
in the data, motivate the use of extrapolative techniques to forecast and backcast average VA
disability trends. Assuming a ﬂoor on the average VA disability rating of 0.5 percent, which
is the smallest measure within samples shown in Tables 4 and 5, I extrapolate average VA
disability ratings by age for the ﬁve wartime cohorts starting with World War II assuming
piecewise linear trajectories through age. Figure 6 plots the actual data, shown by the
markers, alongside extrapolated values. These estimates should be viewed with skepticism
given the small number of cohorts and limited time period of observation. Forecasts for the
First Gulf War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are based on few real data points, and it
is certainly conceivable that there are upper limits on disability ratings that younger cohorts
will simply reach earlier in their lives. But the similar age slopes that emerge across diﬀerent
22cohorts in the data are reassuring, as is the fact that Vietnam veterans have remained so
diﬀerent from earlier cohorts.
Strong age eﬀects in the average VA disability rating raise the question of exactly what
rate to use in determining the total lifetime impacts of war on the health of a cohort. If
there were known bottlenecks in assigning VA disability ratings that drove the age-related
trajectory, one could argue that the maximum observed rating is the appropriate measure
of lifetime harm. But the delays of several decades apparent in the data seem more likely
to have emerged from the latency of health impacts. If latency is important, the lifetime
impact on health is arguably best captured by an average of VA disability ratings over all
ages, ideally weighted by survivorship. I assume VA disability rates are ﬂat after the levels
shown at age 90 in Figure 6, and I apply the survivorship probabilities shown in Figure 1 to
recover the following lifetime average VA disability ratings for wartime cohorts, which are
also shown in Table 6: World War II, 1.8 percent; Korea, 1.7 percent; Vietnam, 5.2 percent;
First Gulf War, 9.8 percent; Iraq and Afghanistan, 9.4 percent.
The paucity of data on VA disability ratings for veterans of conﬂicts prior to World War
II hinders cost estimates for those periods. But with average lifetime VA disability rates for
later conﬂicts, I can estimate the costs of death and disability using assumptions about the
historical value of a statistical life.
5.2 Historical trends in the value of a statistical life
Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) assume the value of a statistical life (VSL) equals $7.2 million in
2007 dollars, which equals the central estimate of $6.2 million in 2002 dollars used by the
Environmental Protection Agency (Dockins et al., 2004) adjusted for inﬂation. The earlier
estimate was itself an inﬂation-adjusted update of EPA’s earlier assumption of $4.8 million in
1990 dollars. All these ﬁgures ﬁt within the relatively wide range of $4 to $9 million implied
by U.S. labor market data on wage diﬀerentials associated with mortality risks (Viscusi and
Aldy, 2003). But is the VSL really ﬁxed in real terms over time, as Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008)
23and others have assumed? If there is any growth in the VSL over time, it will strongly aﬀect
estimates of the private costs of disability and death during historical periods.
Economic theory suggests the VSL ought to depend on the marginal utility of living
relative to that of consumption.23 Two prior studies systematically assess how the VSL
varies over space and time. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) conduct a meta-review of the literature
on the VSL in U.S. labor market studies since the 1960s and in a cross section of countries.
They estimate the income elasticity of the VSL, ηV SL, in the range of 0.5 to 0.6. Costa and
Kahn (2004), who examine U.S. data between 1940 and 1980, report ηV SL to be around 1.5
to 1.7. In an interesting study of the decision to deploy costly military resources in order
to reduce casualties, Rohlfs (2006) estimates a VSL in World War II, roughly $1 million in
2003 dollars, that is consistent with the ﬁndings of Costa and Kahn (2004).
23The question is how these may vary over time. The former is equal to the lifetime sum of discounted
streams of ﬂow utility from consumption, u(c(t)), while the latter is u′(c(t)). Then the VSL for a particular
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For determining change in the VSL over time, the two additive functions of ¯ c in equation (3) are important;
the other elements are either constant or relatively inconsequential. As discussed by Hall and Jones (2007),
the critical issue is the level of γ, which the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption, and it is the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption declines. When that rate is high,
the marginal utility of consumption falls quickly as consumption rises over time. If γ is suﬃciently high that
the marginal utility of consumption falls faster than the marginal utility of life, the VSL rises. When γ is
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Murphy and Topel (2006) provide a more extensive theoretical treatment and arrive at a similar result.
A problem is that γ is an unknown parameter. Empirical studies, which are typically based on ﬁnancial
data, do not agree on its magnitude, and its value in calibration exercises ranges between 0.5, 1, 2, and can
be larger. As a result, it is better to rely on direct estimations of ηV SL.
24Uncertainty about the magnitude of ηV SL is a clear hindrance for studies of the value
of health improvements or harms over long historical periods. Such studies have typically
assumed ηV SL ≥ 1, as reported by Costa and Kahn (2004) and Rohlfs (2006) because such
a level is consistent with other microeconometric estimates of parameters and appears to
ﬁt historical trends better. For example, Nordhaus (2003) assumes ηV SL = 1 but suspects
that is too low given the rising share of GDP that is devoted to health spending; that trend
suggests the marginal utility of consumption must be falling faster than the marginal utility
of living, hence ηV SL > 1. Murphy and Topel (2006) argue that an array of indirect micro
and macro empirical evidence suggests ηV SL > 1.33, and Hall and Jones (2007) make a
similar assumption. While the empirical literature does not speak with one voice on what
ηV SL is, the emerging consensus at least in longitudinal studies seems to be that it is equal
to or greater than unity.
Because there is uncertainty about ηV SL, I produce two sets of time series of the VSL, one
based on the ﬁndings of Costa and Kahn (2004) and the other on Viscusi and Aldy (2003).
First, I use the estimates reported by Costa and Kahn (2004) of the VSL between 1940 and
1980 and forecast and backcast it using their estimate of ηV SL = 1.5, inﬂating all into 2008
dollars. These estimates are shown in the third column of Table 6, where the implied VSL
ranges from $93,000 in 1783 to $1.9 million in 1945 and $14.9 million in 2008.
Alternatively, I estimate a time series using the results of Viscusi and Aldy (2003), who
settle on a median estimate of $7 million per statistical life in 2000 and an elasticity of
ηV SL = 0.5 or 0.6. I inﬂate the $7 million ﬁgure to 2008 dollars using the CPI, and I
backcast and forecast the VSL using ηV SL = 0.5. This time series appears in the sixth
column of Table 6. Because the assumed income elasticity is lower, the backcast VSL is
considerably higher, $1.6 million in 1783 and $5.3 million in 1945. But the forecast is lower
than in the Costa and Kahn (2004) series, reaching $9.2 million in 2008. This is still higher
than other recent estimates in which the VSL is assumed to be ﬁxed in real terms, such as
the level of $7.2 million in 2007 assumed by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008).
255.3 Costs of injury and death in 2008 dollars
The other columns in Table 6 tally the estimated costs associated with death and disability
among service members for as many major U.S. wars as I have data. I can place values on
lives lost back to the Revolutionary War, but data limitations preclude me from calculating
the costs associated with disability for cohorts of veteran who served before World War
II. The cost associated with death is the product of the number of war fatalities and the
estimated VSL at the end of the war the number of war deaths, which equals the aggregate
willingness to pay to avoid them. Similarly, the cost of disability is the product of the
number of surviving veterans, the lifetime average VA disability rating estimated for that
cohort, and the VSL. The implicit assumption is that being x percent disabled is equivalent
to losing x percent of a life.
These costs are very large regardless of which VSL baseline I use. This is because the
levels of the VSL always tend to be high regardless of their income elasticity. The cost of
World War II deaths ranges from $764 billion to $2.2 trillion, or between roughly 20 and 50
percent of the direct military cost. In the case of the Civil War, the costs associated with
deaths are several orders of magnitude greater than the direct military costs. Costs of deaths
in Iraq and Afghanistan total between $50 and $80 billion depending on on the VSL series
used.
The costs of disability are very large also because the VSL is high, and also because
lifetime average VA disability rates among veteran cohorts are high, especially among the
Vietnam and later cohorts. Disability among the World War II cohort was less costly than
deaths, presumably because the mortality rate was suﬃciently high relative to VA disability
rates among survivors. In Korea, however, survival had improved enough to push the costs
of disability to around two or three times the cost of deaths. This trend has continued. For
each of the last three conﬂicts starting with Vietnam, I estimate the costs of disability to be
$2 trillion or more, a ﬁgure that dwarfs all associated budgetary costs and is large relative
to other recent estimates. By comparison, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) estimate the total
26costs of disability to be between $250 and $367 billion,24 while Wallsten and Kosec (2005)
project $100 billion. If the lifetime average VA disability rate among OEF/OIF soldiers were
1 percent rather than my extrapolation of 9.4 percent, then the costs of statistical injury
would total between $200 and $300 billion, or about a ninth of the estimates shown in Table
6. If VA disability rates for this cohort were instead to remain at the level of 2.9 percent
shown in Table 4, total costs of disability would range between $550 and $900 billion.
6 A counterfactual: Peacetime costs
In assessing the costs of war, it is worthwhile to posit a counterfactual scenario in order
to gauge costs in relation to alternatives. The diﬃculty lies in imagining a world without
war. An extreme scenario in which no standing army is maintained seems especially far-
fetched, but other baselines may seem equally implausible. A useful if perhaps not completely
plausible counterfactual is to imagine the U.S. maintaining a peacetime military only. Such
a scenario implicitly assumes that the power of deterrence alone could prevent war, which
may not be right.
Table 5 reveals that even peacetime veterans claim VA disability, although at much lower
average rates because the prevalence of disability is reduced. On average, the peacetime vet-
erans in Table 5 experience disability rates between 2 and 6 times as high as similar wartime
veterans in Table 4, with a focal point of about 2.5. It is more diﬃcult to compare VA
spending per veteran between wartime and peacetime veterans. But to the extent the His-
torical Statistics allow the analysis, they reveal a roughly similar story. The ratio of spending
per wartime veteran to spending per peacetime veteran averaged about 2.5 for compensation
and health spending combined between 1960 and 1970, and 1.9 for compensation alone. And
for the entire period from 1960 to 1997, compensation was also about 1.9 times higher for
wartime veterans. A factor of 2.5 separating costs per capita seems like a reasonable ﬁgure
24Here I am counting all the social economic costs listed by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) in Table 4.1, minus
the cost of deaths, and not including the oﬀsetting disability beneﬁts.
27given the evidence on disability and need and on actual transfers.
The other major diﬀerence between peacetime and wartime is force strength, which deter-
mines the number of veterans produced. Estimates in Table 5 suggest that roughly 250,000
unique veterans are produced per year in peacetime. This rate may have fallen in recent
years under the all-volunteer force, but it is roughly consistent with data on annual military
accessions during the 1990s.25 As revealed in Table 1, wartime troop levels vary widely across
conﬂicts. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been no apparent increase in
force strength above peacetime levels, although reservists and National Guard have been
utilized to an unprecedented degree. Excluding the most recent war, a reasonable baseline
is that a wartime year produces a million veterans, or 4 times as many as a peacetime year.
Combining the factor of 2.5 from the diﬀerence in per capita beneﬁts with the four-fold
increase in veterans yields a diﬀerence of a factor of 10 between wartime and peacetime
veterans’ costs.
By comparison, real direct military spending on recent wars has averaged about $125
billion per year, equal to roughly 25 percent of the average real defense budget over the past
two decades. That is, each year of war raises direct military spending by 25 percent. The
direct costs of warfare can certainly be high, as evidenced by the accumulated total for the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which currently exceeds a trillion dollars over 9 years. But
the component of military costs that is most sensitive to military action actually appears to
be future veterans’ compensation and beneﬁts.
This result would be bolstered if the total costs were expanded to include any uncom-
pensated costs of injury and death that are borne by veterans. The sensitivity of veterans’
costs to warfare is also more salient because direct military spending raises GDP and thus
lowers its net ﬁscal impact, while the same may not be true for veterans’ beneﬁts.
25These data, reported in Table 584 of the 2000 Statistical Abstract of the U.S., show ﬁrst enlistments
at about 180,000 per year and reenlistments around 190,000 during the 1990s. Considering that the overall
force size was roughly stationary during this period, these statistics suggest that the annual production of
veterans was around 200,000.
287 Conclusion
Since the Civil War, at least a third of the federal budgetary costs associated with warfare
have been decidedly long-lived. Direct military spending still accounts for the majority of
war-related spending, but veterans’ beneﬁts represent a signiﬁcant minority that follows a
very diﬀerent life cycle. In this paper, I have shown that as much as 80 percent of the total
present value of U.S. war spending in a conﬂict has been allocated to veterans’ compensation
and beneﬁts, which are spread out over the relatively long remaining life spans of veterans
and their survivors. Even for short, seemingly cheap engagements like the Spanish American
War or the more recent First Gulf War, the unfunded liability of future veterans’ beneﬁts
looms as a signiﬁcant ﬁscal burden.
The half life of the present value of veterans’ costs tends to be 30 years or more. The
front-loading of beneﬁts through educational subsidies like the G.I. Bill tends to reduce the
half life of costs, but the net eﬀect of such an expansion is to raise the ﬁscal burden, not
reduce it. The committing of troops to a war zone has lasting implications for ﬁscal policy
in addition to short-term impacts on the economy and tax revenues via direct military
spending. Depending on the scope of the conﬂict, the unfunded obligation to pay future
veterans’ beneﬁts starting from the end of the conﬂict can range from 5 to 50 percent of
GDP. This is a very large commitment.
It is less clear what the net eﬀects of transfers to veterans and their dependents may be.
As opposed to military purchases, transfers do not aﬀect income unless the propensity to
spend them is higher than it is among taxpayers. At worst, higher tax rates needed to fund
transfers are disincentives to work and save that may have a depressing eﬀect on GDP. At
its root, veterans’ spending is designed either to compensate for service-related disability or
for time served, or to treat injuries. One of the open questions is to what extent veterans
are compensated for their injuries. Estimates of the private cost of war-related injuries and
deaths seem to imply there are many uncompensated wounds of war. Part of this is due to
high estimates of the value of a statistical life, and part is due to high VA disability rates
29among recent cohorts of veterans.
This study has omitted any costs of war associated with the loss of civilian life or the
destruction of capital. Nor has it assessed the costs borne by opposing sides in conﬂicts nor
the costs of military inaction. As a result, I have little to say about the calculus of military
conﬂict that might lead governments to war or peace, which is a clear gap in our knowledge
and a subject of much interesting research Blattman and Miguel (2010). My goals have been
to illustrate the life cycle of veterans’ costs and assess their ﬁscal implications, which are
large.
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34Table 1: Participants, deaths, and wounded in major U.S. wars
Wounds Wounded
not Surviving as a share of:
Conﬂict Personnel Killed mortal veterans Personnel Killed Survivors
Revolutionary Wars 217,000 4,435 6,188 212,565 0.029 1.395 0.029
(1775-1783)
War of 1812 (1812-1815) 286,730 2,260 4,505 284,470 0.016 1.993 0.016
Mexican War (1846-1848) 78,718 13,283 4,152 65,435 0.053 0.313 0.063
Civil War (1861-65) 3,277,556 622,511 478,968 2,655,045 0.146 0.769 0.180
Confederate 1,064,193 258,000 197,087 806,193 0.185 0.764 0.244
Union 2,213,363 364,511 281,881 1,848,852 0.127 0.773 0.152
Spanish American War 306,760 2,446 1,662 304,314 0.005 0.679 0.005
(1898)
World War I (1917-1918) 4,734,991 116,516 204,002 4,618,475 0.043 1.751 0.044
World War II (1941-1945) 16,112,566 405,399 671,846 15,707,167 0.042 1.657 0.043
Korea (1950-1953) 5,720,000 36,576 103,284 5,683,424 0.018 2.824 0.018
Vietnam (1964-1972) 8,744,000 58,200 153,303 8,685,800 0.018 2.634 0.018
First Gulf War (1990-1991) 2,225,000 383 467 2,223,038 0.000 1.219 0.000
Iraq and Afghanistan 2,100,000 5,376 36,906 2,094,624 0.018 6.865 0.018
(OEF/OIF) (2001-)
Sources: For the Korean War and earlier, Historical Statistics of the United States (Carter et al., 2006);
for Vietnam and later, the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) of the Defense Manpower Data
Center. Personnel are the number serving worldwide during the conﬂict. For the First Gulf War, deaths
exclude 1,565 non-theater deaths. Surviving veterans are calculated as the diﬀerence between personnel and
killed.
35Table 2: Budgetary costs of major U.S. wars
Historical and projected
Direct miliary costs veterans’ beneﬁts
Present Total war
value in costs in
Millions Billions Millions Billions billions billions Veterans’
of current of 2008 of current of 2008 of 2008 of 2008 beneﬁts
Conﬂict dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars share
Revolutionary Wars 100 1.8 70 762 0.1 1.8 0.032
(1775-1783)
War of 1812 (1812-1815) 89 1.1 49 483 0.0 1.1 0.022
Mexican War (1846-1848) 82 2.1 64 662 0.2 2.4 0.091
Civil War (1861-65) 3,334 57.1
Confederate 1,032 17.7
Union 2,302 39.5 8,576 75,962 30.2 69.6 0.433
Spanish American War (1898) 270 7.0 5,767 27,895 25.5 32.5 0.785
World War I (1917-1918) 32,700 466.3 96,181 259,279 305.7 771.9 0.396
World War II (1941-1945) 360,000 4,480.3 542,308 742,833 1,373.1 5,853.4 0.235
Korea (1950-1953) 50,000 406.2 201,822 178,189 215.6 621.8 0.347
Vietnam (1964-1972) 140,600 869.9 1,806,737 648,245 554.8 1,424.7 0.389
First Gulf War (1990-1991) 61,000 96.4 2,259,350 407,165 371.9 468.3 0.794
Iraq and Afghanistan 1,559,000 1,559.0 673.3 2,232.3 0.302
(OEF/OIF) (2001-)
Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States (Carter et al., 2006), Nordhaus (2002), Stiglitz and Bilmes
(2008), and author’s calculations. For the last, see the text. The present values of veterans’ beneﬁts are
calculated from the perspective of the midpoint of the conﬂict. From that point, future nominal veterans’
beneﬁts are deﬂated by the cumulative force of nominal discounting. Then the total present value at the
midpoint is inﬂated to 2008 dollars using the historical CPI from the Historical Statistics. Nominal and
real dollar totals for veterans’ costs paid by the former Confederate states following the Civil War exist in
principle but are currently unavailable. Those for OEF/OIF are not reported by Stiglitz and Bilmes.
36Table 3: Relative budgetary costs and impacts of major U.S. wars
Ratio to personnel: Ratio to GDP:
Direct PDV of (measured at)
military veterans’ Direct PDV of Initial Final
Personnel costs in costs in military veterans’ federal federal
per resident 2008 2008 costs costs debt debt
Conﬂict population dollars dollars (start) (end) (start) (end)
Revolutionary Wars 0.077 8,113 267 0.589 0.014
(1775-1783)
War of 1812 (1812-1815) 0.035 3,807 87 0.107 0.002 0.061 0.137
Mexican War (1846-1848) 0.004 27,232 2,723 0.040 0.003 0.008 0.018
Civil War (1861-65) 0.096 17,434 0.714 0.211 0.017 0.239
Confederate 0.114 16,613 0.221
Union 0.090 17,828 13,632 0.493 0.211
Spanish American War (1898) 0.004 22,779 83,182 0.016 0.059 0.074 0.074
World War I (1917-1918) 0.045 98,469 64,559 0.628 0.296 0.040 0.115
World War II (1941-1945) 0.117 278,062 85,218 2.841 0.499 0.359 0.942
Korea (1950-1953) 0.036 71,020 37,695 0.170 0.069 0.736 0.570
Vietnam (1964-1972) 0.044 99,482 63,450 0.212 0.074 0.384 0.252
First Gulf War (1990-1991) 0.009 43,338 167,134 0.011 0.039 0.387 0.414
Iraq and Afghanistan 0.007 742,381 320,619 0.152 0.047 0.329
(OEF/OIF) (2001-)
Sources: See the notes to Tables 1 and 2. Prior to 1940, debt is federal public debt, from Historical Table
Ea587; since 1940, it is federal debt held by the public, from Historical Table Ea728. GDP and debt are
measured either at the beginning or end of each conﬂict. The Spanish American War began and ended in
the same year.
37Table 4: VA disability ratings among wartime veterans
Dataset and year
SAV NSV NSV ACS
Conﬂict Measure 1983 1992 2001 2008
World War I Average VA disability, all survivors 4.1
(1917-1918) Average VA disability given positive rating 57.3
Share with a positive rating 7.1
Veterans with a positive rating 4
All surviving veterans 56
Average age 87.1
Sample size 56
World War II Average VA disability, all survivors 4.4 3.6 4.0 4.4
(1941-1945) Average VA disability given positive rating 34.0 32.1 32.8 35.5
Share with a positive rating 12.8 11.3 12.2 12.4
Veterans with a positive rating 356 931,480 629,282 329,148
All surviving veterans 2779 8,224,585 5,149,093 2,661,782
Average age 63.1 69.5 78.0 84.4
Sample size 2,779 4,016 4,565 32,692
Korea Average VA disability, all survivors 4.7 1.9 3.4 3.6
(1950-1953) Average VA disability given positive rating 42.9 29.3 34.8 34.9
Share with a positive rating 11.0 6.5 9.7 10.3
Veterans with a positive rating 12 283,663 354,050 270,209
All surviving veterans 109 4,350,228 3,641,419 2,612,820
Average age 56.2 59.6 69.0 75.9
Sample size 109 2,111 3,085 33,342
Vietnam Average VA disability, all survivors 2.7 5.3 6.3
(1964-1972) Average VA disability given positive rating 29.4 35.7 42.0
Share with a positive rating 9.2 15.0 15.0
Veterans with a positive rating 778,129 1,252,556 1,100,773
All surviving veterans 8,477,848 8,361,037 7,358,856
Average age 44.0 53.5 60.4
Sample size 3,393 7,063 87,203
First Gulf War Average VA disability, all survivors 4.8 6.3
(1990-1991) Average VA disability given positive rating 29.1 35.4
Share with a positive rating 16.6 17.7
Veterans with a positive rating 494,997 626,495
All surviving veterans 2,989,579 3,534,460
Average age 32.8 38.6
Sample size 2,129 33,718
Iraq and Afghanistan Average VA disability, all survivors 2.9
(OEF/OIF) Average VA disability given positive rating 33.1
Share with a positive rating 8.6
(2001-) Veterans with a positive rating 148,559
All surviving veterans 1,725,203
Average age 27.4
Sample size 14,588
Sources: Author’s calculations from data in the 1983 Survey of Aging Veterans (SAV), the 1992 and 2001
National Surveys of Veterans (NSV), and the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS). Veterans of multiple
wars or periods are counted as belonging to the earliest war. The 1983 SAV did not have sample weights
but was designed to be representative; italics denote unweighted raw counts of veterans in the survey.
38Table 5: VA disability ratings among peacetime-only veterans
Dataset and year
NSV NSV ACS
Conﬂict Measure 1992 2001 2008
Between WWII and Korea Average VA disability, all survivors 0.5 0.7 1.6
(1947-1950) Average VA disability given positive rating 21.8 27.8 29.0
Share with a positive rating 2.5 2.4 5.6
Veterans with a positive rating 1,291 1,031 9,438
All surviving veterans 52,033 42,792 167,376
Average age 61.8 71.5 78.9
Sample size 25 30 2,009
Between Korea and Vietnam Average VA disability, all survivors 0.6 1.2 1.4
(1955-1964) Average VA disability given positive rating 25.0 34.8 28.7
Share with a positive rating 2.4 3.4 4.8
Veterans with a positive rating 53,798 74,280 115,482
All surviving veterans 2,275,898 2,188,335 2,418,879
Average age 53.4 62.8 69.4
Sample size 744 1,473 30,838
Between Vietnam and First Gulf War Average VA disability, all survivors 1.1 2.8 2.8
(1975-1990) Average VA disability given positive rating 21.4 34.8 34.4
Share with a positive rating 5.3 8.2 8.2
Veterans with a positive rating 190,966 221,610 251,184
All surviving veterans 3,631,572 2,706,919 3,080,714
Average age 30.0 40.3 47.3
Sample size 1,149 1,624 264,692
Sources: Author’s calculations from data in the 1992 and 2001 National Surveys of Veterans (NSV), and the
2008 American Community Survey (ACS). Veterans of multiple wars or periods are counted as belonging
to the earliest war. For example, all veterans identiﬁed as belonging to the period between the Korean and
Vietnam wars served then but could not have served during any conﬂict nor during any earlier peacetime
period.
39Table 6: Costs of death and injury resulting from major U.S. wars
Value of Statistical Life (VSL) Value of Statistical Life (VSL)
from Costa and Kahn (2004) from Viscusi and Aldy (2003)
GDP Lifetime Costs of Costs of Costs of Costs of
per average VSL in death disability VSL in death disability
capita VA dis- 1,000’s billions billions 1,000’s billions billions
in 2008 ability of 2008 of 2008 of 2008 of 2008 of 2008 of 2008
Conﬂict dollars rating dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars
Revolutionary Wars 1,516 93 0.4 1,612 7.1
(1775-1783)
War of 1812 (1812-1815) 1,902 131 0.3 1,805 4.1
Mexican War (1846-1848) 2,519 199 2.6 2,078 27.6
Civil War (1861-65) 3,147 278 173.1 2,322 1,445.5
Confederate 3,147 278 71.7 2,322 599.1
Union 3,147 278 101.3 2,322 846.4
Spanish American War 5,317 610 1.5 3,018 7.4
(1898)
World War I (1917-1918) 7,628 1,049 122.2 3,615 421.2
World War II (1941-1945) 16,542 1.8 1,885 764.2 532.9 5,324 2,158.3 1,505.2
Korea (1950-1953) 16,910 1.7 2,353 86.1 227.3 5,383 196.9 520.1
Vietnam (1964-1972) 25,486 5.2 6,499 378.2 2,935.3 6,608 384.6 2,984.6
First Gulf War (1990-1991) 36,215 9.8 9,483 3.6 2,067.4 7,877 3.0 1,717.3
Iraq and Afghanistan 49,021 9.4 14,935 80.3 2,940.6 9,165 49.3 1,804.5
(OEF/OIF) 2001-
Sources: See earlier tables. Income (GDP) and the value of a statistical life (VSL) are measured at the ﬁnal
year of the conﬂict. I specify two alternative time series of the VSL by extrapolating from the results of
Costa and Kahn (2004) or Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Costa and Kahn (2004) measure the VSL directly for
the U.S. between 1940 and 1980; I geometrically interpolate the VSL for intervening years, and I forecast
from 1980 and backcast from 1940 using the GDP series and their preferred estimate of the income elasticity
of the VSL, ηV SL = 1.5. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) place the median estimate of the VSL at $7 million in
current collars in the year 2000 and recover ηV SL = 0.5 based on their meta-analysis. I forecast and backcast
their VSL from 2000 using the GDP series and ηV SL = 0.5. Lifetime average VA disability ratings apply
to the entire cohort of surviving veterans (not just those injured) and are based on data and extrapolations
shown in Table 4 and Figures 1 and 6 and as described in the text. The costs of death are the product of
killed and the VSL. The costs of disability are calculated as the product of surviving veterans, the VSL, and
the lifetime average VA disability rating.
40Figure 1: The life cycles of veterans of major U.S. wars























































Years from end of conflict
 
 
War of 1812 (1812−1815)
Mexican War (1846−1848)
Civil War (1861−1865)
Spanish American War (1898)
World War I (1917−1918)
World War II (1941−1945)
Korea (1950−1953)
Vietnam (1964−1972)
First Gulf War (1990−1991)
Notes: Data are the proportion of veterans surviving each year by period of service, constructed as the
ratio of veterans in the given year divided by the maximum over all years. Some survivorships are less than
unity because conﬂicts are ongoing. For the Spanish American War, veteran population counts are volatile
for unknown reasons. The sources are Tables Ed 245–261 in the Historical Statistics of the United States
(Carter et al., 2006), and projections from the VA’s VetPop 2007 model. Prior to 1940, data are reported
only every 5 years or less and are loglinearly interpolated. Unless given in the data, initial populations are
equal to surviving war participants as shown in Table 1.
41Figure 2: Real spending on veterans of major U.S. wars, 1783-1860






































War of 1812 (1812−1815)
Mexican War (1846−1848)
Notes: Data are nominal spending on veteran cohorts deﬂated or inﬂated by the CPI to produce 2008
dollars. The sources are Tables Ed 324–336 and Cc 1–2 in the Historical Statistics of the United States
(Carter et al., 2006).
42Figure 3: Real spending on veterans of major U.S. wars, 1861-1917







































Notes: Data are nominal spending on veteran cohorts deﬂated or inﬂated by the CPI to produce 2008
dollars. The sources are Tables Ed 324–336 and Cc 1–2 in the Historical Statistics of the United States
(Carter et al., 2006).
43Figure 4: Real spending on veterans of major U.S. wars since 1918




































World War I (1917−1918)
World War II (1941−1945)
Korea (1950−1953)
Vietnam (1964−1972)
First Gulf War (1990−1991)
Notes: Data are nominal spending on veteran cohorts deﬂated or inﬂated by the CPI to produce 2008
dollars. The sources are Tables Ed 311–323, Ed 324–336, Ed 351–371 and Cc 1–2 in the Historical Statistics
of the United States (Carter et al., 2006), and author’s calculations and forecasts as described in the text.
44Figure 5: The life cycles of present-value veterans’ costs for major U.S. wars








































































War of 1812 (1812−1815)
Mexican War (1846−1848)
Civil War (1861−1865)
Spanish American War (1898)
World War I (1917−1918)
World War II (1941−1945)
Korea (1950−1953)
Vietnam (1964−1972)
First Gulf War (1990−1991)
Notes: The data show at each year following the end of hostilities the percent of the total present value of
past, present and future veterans’ costs associated with the conﬂict that remain to be paid out. For example,
a ﬁgure of 0.5 in year 20 means that 20 years after the conﬂict, half of the total present value of costs have
been paid out. Present values are calculated from the perspective of the end of the conﬂict. For sources, see
the text.
45Figure 6: Trajectories of average VA disability ratings among cohorts since World War II




















































Age of veteran cohort
 
 
World War II (1941−1945)
Korea (1950−1953)
Vietnam (1964−1972)
First Gulf War (1990−1991)
Iraq and Afghanistan (2001−)
Notes: Statistics are the average VA disability rating within a veteran cohort. Actual data are shown by
the markers and are taken from Table 4. The rest of the data are extrapolated by assuming piecewise linear
age eﬀects are common across all cohorts, ﬁxed cohort eﬀects, and a ﬂoor on VA disability of 0.5 percent,
the minimum within samples shown in Tables 4 and 5.
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